In multi-unit auctions, such as auctions of commodities and securities, it is necessary to specify rationing rules to break ties between multiple marginal bids. The standard approach in the literature and in practice is to ration marginal bids proportionally. This paper shows how bidding can be made more competitive -and the auctioneer can increase its surplus -if the rationing rule instead gives increasing priority to bidders with a small volume of marginal bids at clearing prices closer to the reservation price. In comparison to standard rationing, such a rule can for bene…cial circumstances have almost the same e¤ect on the competitiveness of bids as a doubling of the number of bidders.
Introduction
A wide range of products, commodities and assets are traded in divisible-good or multi-unit auctions. For instance, auctions of electricity, treasury bills and emission permits as well as …nancial exchanges, all allow bids for more than one unit of the traded items. In multi-unit auctions, each bidder submits a stack of bids, where each bid speci…es a bid price and a bid quantity such that the bidder is willing to trade the speci…ed bid quantity at the speci…ed bid price or better. Unless by coincidence, at least some of the marginal bids with a bid price equal to the clearing price would have to be partly rejected. It is therefore necessary to specify a rationing rule that breaks ties in multi-unit auctions. Rationing rules are of particular importance for the outcome in auctions where bid prices accumulate at a few price levels, as usually happens in …nancial exchanges 1 , frequent batch auctions 2 and auctions of …nancial securities. Multi-round auctions (such as clockauctions 3 ) where the auctioneer signi…cantly restricts the number of price levels that a bidder can use is another application where rationing is important. The purpose of this paper is to study how rationing rules can be designed to increase the competition among a set of bidders, to the bene…t of the auctioneer.
Most auctions use price priority. This means that all sell bids with a bid price below the clearing price are accepted and all buy bids with a bid price above the clearing price are accepted; only marginal bids are rationed. In single-round auctions, it is standard practice to ration marginal bids pro-rata, so that the same percentage of the marginal bid quantity is accepted from each bidder. In exchanges with continuous trading, it is also common to give priority to marginal bids that arrive early at the exchange; this is referred to as price-time priority. The IEX 4 exchange uses price-broker-time priority: this means that buy and sell orders at the same price from the same broker are matched before giving priority to early bids. 5 Field and Large (2012) empirically observe that, in comparison to pricetime priority, pro-rata rationing signi…cantly increases bid quantities in the order book of …nancial exchanges, but also the cancellation rate of bids. This veri…es that the design of the rationing rule in ‡uences bidding behaviour in auctions also in practice.
I evaluate rationing rules in uniform-price auctions, where all accepted bids are transacted at the clearing price. Uniform-price auctions are, for example, used in most wholesale electricity markets, in U.S. treasury auctions and in frequent batch auctions. I focus on the procurement auction, where the auctioneer buys items, but the results are analogous for sales auctions. In my model, a parameter j 0 indicates the extent to which the rationing rule gives disproportionate priority to bidders with a large volume of marginal bids at a clearing price P j . Obviously, a procurer bene…ts if bidders o¤er many items at low prices, thus a procurer would prefer a rationing rule that encourages bidders to specify large bid quantities at low bid prices, which corresponds to a large j . However, bid stacks that result in large volumes of marginal bids when the clearing price is high should be discouraged by the auctioneer, as they will lead to less quantity being o¤ered at low bid prices. Thus j should be small for high clearing prices. Hence, disproportionality of the rationing rule should change with the clearing price, such that j is lower for clearing prices closer to the reservation price.
I assume that each bidder submits a stack of v + 1 sell bids with di¤erent bid prices and that the auctioneer wants to maintain the same pro-competitive e¤ect at each bid price. In this case, I show that an optimal use of disproportionate rationing on the margin in an auction with N symmetric bidders gives the auctioneer approximately the same procurement cost as an auction with pro rata on the margin rationing and 1 + 1 v (N 1) + 1 > N symmetric bidders with the same aggregate production cost. Thus, changing to the optimal rationing rule from pro-rata on the margin almost corresponds to a doubling of the number of bidders when each bidder submits a stack with two bid prices. The e¤ect is smaller, the larger the number of bids per supplier.
It is optimal to let disproportionality of the rationing rule, the parameter j , depend on the clearing price. Still, non-optimal rationing rules where j is independent of the clearing price can also have a pro-competitive e¤ect. This is for example the case when price increments (the di¤erence between bid prices in the bid stack of a bidder) are non-constant. I show that a rationing rule that gives disproportionate priority to bidders with a small volume of marginal bids (e.g. j = 0) at every clearing price would boost competition if price increments of bidders are larger towards the reservation price. This would be the case if the bidding format requires large price increments near the reservation price and allow for smaller price increments towards the clearing price. Such bidding formats are sometimes used to speed up multi-round auctions, such as in Canadian spectrum auctions.
I use Nash equilibria of a static game to predict the bidding behaviour for di¤erent rationing rules. Analogous to Back and Zender (1993) , Kremer and Nyborg (2004) and the literature on Supply Function Equilibria (SFE), I assume that costs are common knowledge among sellers, but the auctioneer is imperfectly informed of the costs. The auctioneer's demand is uncertain as in the SFE model. This uncertainty could also represent an uncertain amount of non-competitive bids (Kremer and Nyborg, 2004; Wang and Zender, 2002) . 6 The SFE model is often used to evaluate the design of wholesale electricity markets. 7 Analogous equilibria of demand functions from bidders in sales auctions have been used to evaluate treasury auctions in the U.S. (Wang and Zender, 2002) .
In this paper, a stepped supply function is used to represent the bid stack of each bidder. Similar to Holmberg et al. (2013) , I use a discrete version of Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) concept to analyse Nash equilibria of stepped supply functions. But I generalize Holmberg et al.'s (2013) model to allow for disproportionate rationing on the margin and nonconstant price increments. I establish existence of symmetric Nash equilibria for simple cases with constant marginal costs, uniformly distributed demand shocks and two bids per supplier. My results for multiple bids per supplier, increasing marginal costs and non-uniform demand shocks follow from an approximation of the …rst-order condition for symmetric suppliers.
As in practice, rationing is on the margin in my analysis. However, Kremer and Nyborg (2004) show that an auctioneer could make equilibrium bids even more competitive if it is prepared to sidestep price priority and ration also infra-marginal bids. The spread rationing rule (SRR) and the concentrate rationing rule (CRR) examined by Saez et al. (2007) may also result in rationing of infra-marginal bids. Gresik (2001) proposes a new rule, -rationing, where marginal bids (when possible) are rationed in proportion to the total amount that a bidder wants to trade at the marginal price. McAdams (2000) explores the extent to which rationing rules may provide the auctioneer with a tool for deterring collusive bidding. In order to ensure the existence of Nash equilibria in theoretical models of auctions, such as in papers by Deneckere and Kovenock (1996) , Fabra et al. (2006) , Simon and Zame (1990) , and Jackson and Swinkels (1999) , it is sometimes convenient to consider type-dependent rationing rules, for example where priority is given to the most e¢ cient marginal bids, such as marginal sell bids with the lowest marginal cost. However, such rationing rules are di¢ cult to apply in practice, where bidders'true costs/values are normally not observed by the auctioneer. The present paper is the …rst to use a rationing rule that depends on the clearing price, and that explores the advantages with such a rule.
Section 2 describes the setting of the game. The analysis is carried out in Section 3. Section 4 discusses some extensions that may be of practical relevance. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are derived in the Appendix. renewable production and production that cannot be switched o¤ is often o¤ered at the lowest possible price, which corresponds to a non-competitive bid. 7 In electricity markets, technology characteristics and fuel prices are transparent and producers make o¤ers before the demand for electricity has been realized (Anderson and Hu, 2008; Green and Newbery, 1992; Holmberg and Newbery, 2009) . Observed o¤ers match the …rst-order condition of a stepped SFE model so well that the theory cannot be rejected (Wolak, 2007) . The continuous SFE model is less precise. In practice, it can only make accurate predictions of bids from large …rms, whose submitted supply functions have many steps (Hortaçsu and Puller, 2008; Sioshansi and Oren, 2007 
Model
Consider a uniform-price procurement auction, so that all accepted bids are paid the Market Clearing Price (MCP). A stepped supply function is used to represent the bid stack of each bidder. As illustrated by Figure 1 , the market is cleared at the lowest price where aggregated supply is larger than the auctioneer's demand. Any excess supply at the MCP is rationed on the margin. I calculate a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a one-shot game, where each risk-neutral supplier chooses a step supply function to maximize its expected pro…t.
Similar to Holmberg et al. (2013) there are M permissible price levels, P j , j 2 f1; : : : ; M g, with the price tick P j = P j P j 1 > 0. The minimum quantity increment is zero, i.e. quantities can be continuously varied. The di¤erence to Holmberg et al. (2013) is that I now allow for non-constant tick-sizes and non-pro rata rationing on the margin. I let r =
, where it is assumed that r is a bounded positive constant.
Producer i 2 f1; : : : ; N g submits a supply vector
consisting of the non-negative maximum quantities it is willing to produce at each permissible price level. The quantity increment S and denote competitors' collective o¤ered quantity at price P j as S i j and total market supply at P j as S j . The cost function of supplier i; C i (S i ), is a smooth, increasing and convex function up to the capacity constraint k i .
8 Let k be the total production capacity in the market. The auctioneer is imperfectly informed, but costs are common 8 Production capacities in my procurement setting corresponds to purchase constraints in sales auctions. As an example, the U.S. Treasury auction has a 35% rule, which prevents anyone from knowledge among suppliers. Klemperer and Meyer's (1989) continuous model is used as a benchmark. The set of individual smooth supply functions in the continuous model is given by
The auctioneer's demand is perfectly inelastic up to the reservation price P M . Demand is uncertain and given by the shock ". The shock has a continuous probability density, g("), with g g(") g > 0 on the support ["; "]. MCP is the lowest price at which the o¤ered supply is (strictly) larger than the stochastic demand shock. Thus, the equilibrium price as a function of the demand shock, P ("), is right continuous, and the MCP equals P j if " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ). Given chosen step supply functions, the market clearing price can be calculated for each demand shock in the interval ["; "]. The lowest and highest prices that are realized are denoted by P L and P H , respectively, where 1 L < H M . I let s (") and s i (") be total accepted supply and supplier i's accepted supply at ", respectively.
The rationing rule
I consider a new class of rules with rationing on the margin and where disproportionality of the rationing rule depends on the clearing price. The rules are such that any bid accepted for some demand shock " 0 is also accepted for any " > " 0 . This means that a bidder's acceptance is monotonic with respect to the demand shock, so that
0. For a given set of supply schedules, the outcome of the auction is the same (irrespective of the sharing rule) when there is no excess supply at MCP, i.e. S j 1 = ". In this case, we have:
The rationing rule determines how to accept bids when S j 1 < " < S j . In this paper, the parameter j determines the non-linearity of the sharing rule at the clearing price P j , i.e. the extent to which large quantity increments at this clearing price are given priority to small increments. The increment of producer i's accepted supply s i for a shock increment " is determined by its volume of marginal bids that were not accepted at demand ", i.e. S i j s i ("), how it relates to the total volume of marginal bids that were not accepted at ", and the non-linearity of the rationing rule, j .
I consider j 0, so that the rationing rule results in monotonic acceptance (in absolute terms) in the sense that a larger quantity increment at the marginal price will (weakly) increase the accepted volume from marginal bids of the supplier. Similarly, the rationing rule gives monotonic rejection (in absolute terms), i.e. a larger quantity increment at the marginal price will also (weakly) increase the rejected volume from marginal bids of a supplier. For j = 1, we get pro rata on buying more than 35% of the auctioneer's supply. This is to avoid a situation where a single bidder can corner the market. the margin rationing, where any additional demand " is allocated in proportion to a supplier's unmet supply at the clearing price, S i j s i (").
9 It follows from (2) that with j > 1, disproportionate priority is given to producers with large unmet supply at the clearing price. When j ! 1, " is shared equally among suppliers with the largest unmet supply at the clearing price, while suppliers with less unmet supply at P j get no share of ". We say that this rule gives maximum priority to large quantity increments at P j (subject to rejection being monotonic for the rationing rule). The parameter range 0 j < 1 gives more priority to small quantity increments. In particular, j = 0 gives maximum priority to small quantity increments at P j (subject to acceptance being monotonic for the rationing rule). In this case, all suppliers with unmet supply at the clearing price get the same share of any additional marginal demand increment ". Note that
i.e. the marginal increase in total accepted supply always equals the marginal shock increment, regardless of the rationing rule.
Together with the initial condition in (1), a system of di¤erential equations of the type in (2), with one equation per bidder, can be used to calculate the accepted quantity for each supplier as a function of the demand shock for any given set of monotonic step supply functions.
10 From the supply s i (") allocated to each supplier, it is straightforward to calculate the supplier's expected pro…t:
Analysis
In the following subsection I derive a …rst-order condition for optimal bids when rationing is disproportionate on the margin and non-linearity of the rationing rule depends on the clearing price. Then, I will analyse a simple case with two permissible price levels, where existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured for uniformdemand shocks and constant marginal costs. The third subsection of the analysis section presents approximate results for cases with many permissible price levels, increasing marginal costs and non-uniform demand shocks.
The …rst-order condition
Optimal bids of a supplier can be determined from the following …rst-order condition.
Lemma 1 The …rst-order condition for a uniform-price auction with N symmetric suppliers is given by:
where k 6 = i and S j (u) :
The …rst-order condition can be intuitively interpreted as follows. When calculating @E ( i ) =@S i j , supply is increased at P j while holding the supply at all other price levels constant. This implies that the bid price of one (in…nitesimally small) unit of quantity is decreased from P j+1 to P j . This decreases the MCP for the event when the unit is price-setting, i.e. when " = S j . This event brings a negative contribution to the expected pro…t, which corresponds to the …rst term in the …rst-order condition (5). This term corresponds to the price e¤ect; the term is negative as a bid price was decreased. Due to the rationing mechanism, decreasing the price for one unit of quantity (weakly) increases the accepted supply for demand outcomes " 2 S j 1 ; S j+1 . This gives a positive contribution to the expected pro…t; the two integrals in (5). The …rst integral covers " 2 S j 1 ; S j when the MCP is P j , and the second for " 2 S j 1 ; S j when the MCP is P j+1 . The …rst integral corresponds to the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at price P j and the second integral corresponds to the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at price P j+1 . The two integral terms are positive since a bid price was decreased. There are two reasons why supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j would dominate the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j+1 . First, if the market is more likely to clear at P j than at P j+1 . The other reason is that supplier i has higher average mark-ups at P j than at P j+1 . We also note the following from Lemma 1:
Remark 1 For given supply schedules S, the loss associated with supplier i's quantity e¤ect when increasing the bid price for some units of output from P j to P j+1 becomes larger if 1. the rationing rule gives increased priority to large quantity increments at P j compared to P j+1 , i.e. j increases and/or j+1 decreases.
2. supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j dominates the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j+1 , the same rationing rule is used at P j and P j+1 , and the rationing rule gives increased priority to large quantity increments, i.e. j = j+1 increases.
3. supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j+1 dominates the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j , the same rationing rule is used at P j and P j+1 , and the rationing rule gives increased priority to small quantity increments, i.e. j = j+1 decreases.
We notice from the …rst-order condition in Lemma 1 that the price e¤ect does not depend on the rationing rule, so bidding becomes more competitive for rationing rules that strengthen the quantity e¤ect. Thus the …rst point indicates that an optimal rationing rule would have a j that decreases for higher clearing prices, or equivalently, increases for lower clearing prices. Even if it is normally not optimal to have a j that is independent of the clearing price, the two last points indicate circumstances where such a rule can have a pro-competitive e¤ect. The following subsections explore Remark 1 in more detail.
Two price levels
To illustrate the e¤ect of disproportionate rationing on equilibrium bids, we …rst analyse a simple case with only two admissible price levels, P 1 and P 2 . In order to ensure existence of Nash equilibria, we make the following restrictive assumption: Assumption 1. The uniform-price auction has two price levels, P 1 and P 2 . The suppliers are symmetric, each supplier has production capacity k i and a constant marginal cost c P 1 < P 2 , such that (N 1) (P 2 c) N P 2 . Demand is uniformly distributed on [0; k]. We set S i 0 = 0. The inequality (N 1) (P 2 c) N P 2 is used to avoid that Nash equilibria become too competitive, so that all production capacity is o¤ered at P 1 for the most pro-competitive rationing rules. However, one implication of this inequality is also that mark-ups for bids at P 1 must be su¢ ciently small. We can reformulate the inequality as follows:
P 2 > c is the highest possible price, so irrespective of competitors'bids, it is the best response for each supplier to o¤er its entire capacity k i at P 2 , i.e. S i 2 = k i . Thus, market performance is determined by S i 1 . A higher S i 1 means that bids are more competitive, i.e. the average mark-ups are lower. We get the following result:
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, the solution to the …rst-order condition in Lemma 1 is:
As expected from Remark 1, we have from Lemma 2 and the inequality in (6) that S i 1 increases when 2 decreases and/or when 1 increases. We can verify that the following …rst-order solutions are Nash equilibria.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, we can establish Nash equilibria for the following cases 1. A rationing rule that gives maximum priority to large quantity increments at P 1 ( 1 = 1) and maximum priority to small quantity increments at P 2 ( 2 = 0) results in the most competitive …rst-order solution. The symmetric Nash equilibrium for this case is:
2. Auction competitiveness is also improved, but to a smaller extent, when maximum priority is given to small quantity increments at both P 1 and P 2 ( 2 = 1 = 0). The Nash equilibrium for this case is:
3. The Nash equilibrium for pro rata on the margin rationing ( 2 = 1 = 1) is:
In this case, supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 2 dominates the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 1 .
The …rst result is consistent with the …rst point of Remark 1. It is optimal to have a large j at the lowest clearing price and a small j at the highest clearing price. The third result establishes that supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 2 dominates the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 1 for a standard rationing rule. This is a consequence of (6), which ensures that mark-ups of bids at P 1 are su¢ ciently small. Thus the second result is consistent with the third point of Remark 1. In the special case when P 1 = c, the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 1 is zero, so that it is only the price level P 2 that contributes to this loss. In this special case, giving maximum priority to small quantity increments at both P 1 and P 2 ( 2 = 1 = 0) will have the same e¤ect as the optimal rationing rule, i.e. (8) and (9) give the same result.
We can multiply the …rst and third result in Proposition 1 by N to get expressions for total market supply at P 1 . By using the fact that k = N k i , we can deduce the following:
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, a uniform-price auction with N symmetric suppliers and optimal rationing on the margin gives the auctioneer the same total procurement cost as a uniform-price auction with pro rata on the margin rationing and 2N 1 symmetric suppliers with the same total production cost (the same marginal cost c and total production capacity k). Aggregate stepped supply function equilibria when c = 4, P 1 = 5 and P 2 = 10 for four di¤erent cases: A) N = 2, 1 = 2 = 1 (pro-rata on the margin rationing), B) N = 2, 1 = 2 = 0 (maximum priority to short marginal quantity increments at both prices), C) N = 2, 1 = 1, 2 = 0 (optimal rationing) and D) N = 3, 1 = 2 = 1 (pro-rata on the margin rationing for 3 …rms):
Many price levels
In this section, we analyse the case with non-uniform demand shocks, marginal costs that are increasing and supply functions that have many steps, so that the di¤erence equation in Lemma 1 can be approximated by a di¤erential equation. A di¤erence equation is said to be consistent with a di¤erential equation, if the di¤erence equation converges to the said di¤erential equation as the number of steps in the supply schedules increases towards in…nity (LeVeque, 2007; Holmberg et al., 2013) .
Lemma 3 For N symmetric suppliers, the discrete …rst-order condition in Lemma 1 is consistent with the continuous di¤erential equation
) and j > 0. In the special case when tick-sizes are constant, i.e. r = 1, and rationing is proportionate on the margin, i.e. j = 1, (11) can be simpli…ed to
which is the di¤erential equation of continuous supply function equilibria for symmetric suppliers with inelastic demand (Rudkevich, 1998; Anderson and Philpott, 2002; Holmberg, 2008) . This con…rms the consistency result in Holmberg et al. (2013) for pro rata on the margin rationing and constant tick-sizes. A comparison of (11) and (12) implies that for constant tick-sizes (r = 1) and disproportionate rationing on the margin, competitiveness (the number of competitors, N 1) is approximately boosted by the factor
relative to the case with pro rata on the margin rationing. As in the case with two price levels, we note that it is bene…cial for competition to use rationing parameters such that j > j+1 . However, with more price levels, there will be smaller changes in j from one price level to the next and a lower pro-competitive e¤ect, if one wants to maintain the same e¤ect on competition at each price level. We can write (13) in the following form:
By setting the competition boosting factor to a constant and H = 0 (the rationing parameter at the highest realized price), we can iteratively solve for j for sequentially smaller j, until a non-negative solution of j no longer exists. In this way, we can approximately determine for how many steps in a supply function we can maintain at the desired level. The results are summarized in Table 1 .
We can multiply the di¤erential equation in (11) by N , so that we get an equation for total supply, and then note the following from Table 1. Remark 2 A uniform-price auction with optimal rationing on the margin and N symmetric suppliers with v steps in each supply function has approximately the same total procurement cost as a uniform-price auction with pro rata on the margin rationing and (1 + 1=v) (N 1) + 1 symmetric suppliers with the same total production costs and v steps in each supply function.
We also note the following from Lemma 3:
Remark 3 If the rationing rule is the same for each price level, j = j+1 = , but tick-sizes are non-constant, then
1. If tick-sizes decrease towards the reservation price (r > 1), then the competition boosting factor =
increases when the rationing rule gives increased disproportionate priority to large quantity increments at all prices ( ").
2. If tick-sizes increase towards the reservation price (r < 1), then the competition boosting factor =
increases when the rationing rule gives increased disproportionate priority to small quantity increments at all prices ( #).
The intuition behind this result is that smaller tick-sizes towards the reservation price tend to also decrease a supplier's chosen quantity increments in that direction, so that supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j tends to dominate the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P j+1 . The opposite is true if tick-sizes are instead larger towards the reservation price. Thus the results above are consistent with point 2 and 3 in Remark 1. David et al. (2007) and Li and Kuo (2011; show that non-constant ticksizes can improve market competitiveness for single-round auctions with single objects. In multi-unit auctions with a standard rationing rule ( = 1), the competition boosting factor is equal to one irrespective of whether tick-sizes are constant or not. However, note that the …rst-order condition in Lemma 3 is just an approximation, so this does not rule out that there are circumstances where non-constant tick-sizes have a small pro-competitive e¤ect also for the standard rationing rule.
Extensions of the auction design
In the analysed model, each rationing parameter has been tied to a price level, but this may not be optimal in practice. In practice, the bidding format often restricts the number of steps in supply schedules and/or bidders do not always use all allowed steps, because the additional e¤ort required of a supplier to submit another step may not be negligible (Kastl, 2011) . In such cases, it should be su¢ cient to boost competition at bid prices that are used by the supplier, so that a higher boosting factor can be maintained at those fewer prices. In practice, it may therefore be bene…cial to have individual rationing parameters for suppliers, i j , where a supplier's parameter could, for example, depend on the step number in its supply function. The auctioneer may also want to weight supplier's unmet supply, in order to avoid that the disproportionate rationing rule favours small or large suppliers, or to optimize rationing for asymmetric bidders. As an example, a supplier's weight ! i could be inversely proportional to its production capacity or maximum o¤ered supply S i H . Thus (2), could be generalized as follows
Conclusions
For an auctioneer, it is bene…cial if bidders increase quantity increments at prices far from the reservation price and if bidders decrease their quantity increments near the reservation price. It is shown that such a pro-competitive e¤ect on bids can be achieved with rationing rules that prioritize large marginal quantity increments at clearing prices far from the reservation price and then gives increased priority to small marginal quantity increments at price levels closer to the reservation price. I establish existence of Nash equilibria and derive precise results for the simple case with uniformly distributed demand shocks, constant marginal costs that are common knowledge among symmetric suppliers and two price levels. In this case, I show that the optimal use of disproportionate rationing on the margin for a uniform-price auction with N symmetric suppliers gives the auctioneer the same procurement cost as a uniform-price auction with pro rata on the margin rationing and 2N 1 symmetric suppliers with the same total production cost.
Results for non-uniform demand shocks, increasing marginal costs and multiple price levels are approximate. The pro-competitive e¤ect is smaller for supply schedules with more steps that involve multiple price levels. For supply functions with v steps, a uniform-price auction with N symmetric suppliers and an optimal use of disproportionate rationing on the margin at each step roughly gives the auctioneer the same procurement cost as a uniform-price auction with pro rata on the margin rationing and 1 + 1 v (N 1) + 1 > N symmetric suppliers with the same total production cost.
However, even if supply functions have many steps, the auctioneer can still substantially boost competition locally by using disproportionate rationing on the margin at a few price levels, where the auctioneer expects the auction to clear or where the auctioneer is mostly concerned with market competitiveness. Forward prices, prices in when-issued markets or clearing prices of previous auctions can be used to predict the clearing price of an auction.
The paper also identi…es situations where the competitiveness of the auction can be improved if the same rationing rule is used at all price levels. It is also shown how the bidding format, such as the tick-sizes that decrease towards the clearing price, can be tailored to create such situations. Such bidding formats are sometimes used in multi-round auctions, such as spectrum auctions.
The bidding format and parts of the auction software that receives and manages bids can be kept unchanged when implementing a pro-competitive rationing rule, so it should be straightforward to implement it in practice.
As shown by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), uniform-price auctions with small-tick sizes and production/purchase constraints would normally have a price instability, where small cost changes have a large impact on bid prices or where traders use randomized strategies in equilibrium. This exaggerates price volatility, which is a nuisance. Holmberg et al. (2013) show that this problem disappears when tick-sizes are su¢ ciently large relative to the lot size (the smallest allowed quantity increment). This condition is satis…ed in my setting where the lot-size is in…nitesimally small, so that bid quantities can be continuously varied.
Avoiding price-instability is one advantage with having a su¢ ciently large ticksize. Other advantages with having a positive tick-size is that it improves liquidity, simpli…es the trading environment for human traders, reduces the cost of bandwidth and data storage in computers, and reduces the time needed in negotiations (Harris, 1991; Angel, 1997; Angel, 2012) . But there can also be disadvantages. In my model, a positive tick-size does not introduce any welfare losses, as …rms are symmetric and the demand side is perfectly inelastic. In a …nancial exchange, however, the tick-size introduces a transaction cost, which has a negative impact on welfare. A more competitive market due to an improved rationing rule would lower welfare losses.
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Appendix
First, we verify that the special case when j = 1 corresponds to pro rata on the margin rationing at the price level P j .
Lemma 4
The auction has pro rata on the margin rationing at the price level P j when j = 1.
Proof. We can use the identities P N k=1 s k (") " and P N k=1 S k j S j to simplify and then solve (2) when j = 1:
It now follows from the product rule and integration that:
It now follows from (1) that:
which is identical to the accepted supply of a supplier in a uniform-price auction with pro rata on the margin rationing (Holmberg et al., 2013) when demand is inelastic.
The following statement ensures that there is a unique allocation under disproportionate rationing. Note that rationing is never required at price levels where no supplier has a quantity increment.
Lemma 5 For a given set of non-decreasing stepped supply functions S, such that S k j > S k j 1 for at least one supplier k 2 f1; : : : ; N g, there exists a unique rationing allocation at price P j , de…ned by the initial value problem (1) and (2). This unique solution satis…es s i (") S There must be at least one such supplier for " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ), otherwise we would get the contradiction that S j s (") = " for some " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ). We also note that the right-hand side of (2) is Lipschitz continuous in the interval [S j 1 ; " ] for any " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ), so it follows from the Picard-Lindelöf theorem that the initial value problem has a unique solution in the interval [S j 1 ; S j ).
A.1 First-order conditions
From the properties of the sharing rule, it is now possible to derive a …rst-order condition for the optimal supply schedule of a supplier.
Lemma 6 The …rst-order condition for supplier i's optimal output at price P j is:
Proof. The accepted supply of supplier i only depends on S i j for " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ) when the clearing price is P j and for outcomes " 2 [S j ; S j+1 ) when the clearing price is P j+1 . The contribution to the expected pro…t from outcomes " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ) is given by:
The contribution to the expected pro…t from outcomes " 2 [S j ; S j+1 ) is given by:
(16) Summing the contributions from (15) and (16) establishes the result in (14).
In this paper, I will focus on characterizing symmetric Nash equilibria. Thus, I want to …nd the optimal response of a supplier i when its N 1 competitors submit identical bids. It follows from (14) that the optimal stepped supply function is to a large extent determined by how supplier i's accepted supply s i (") depends on its supply function. The following Lemma speci…es this dependence when the supplier's N 1 competitors submit identical bids.
Lemma 7 For N symmetric producers we have that :
Proof. For …xed S i k 8k 6 = j; increasing S i j will increase producer i's quantity increment at the price p j and decrease its quantity increment at the price p j+1 . The quantity increments and the o¤ered supply at all other price levels will remain unchanged. Thus, a change in S i j will only in ‡uence the accepted supply for outcomes " 2 [S j 1 ; S j ) when the clearing price is p j and outcomes " 2 [S j ; S j+1 ) when the clearing price is p j+1 . Let u ki (") = @s k (") @S i j and …rst consider " 2 (S j 1 ; S j ).
It follows from (2) that
Notice that P N k=1 s k (") " and accordingly P N k=1 u ki (") 0. Thus, we can write (17) as follows:
where
We solve this di¤erential equation by means of an integrating factor. Multiplying all terms by 1 (S j ") j +1 yields:
By means of the product rule, we get
We have u ii (S j 1 ) = 0, so
Now, we will repeat the same procedure for the interval " 2 (S j ; S j+1 ) when the price is p j+1 . Again, let u ki (") =
. In this interval, we have (compare with (2))
Symmetry implies that
As before, P N k=1 s k (") " implies that
As above, we solve this di¤erential equation by means of an integrating factor. Multiplying all terms by 1 (S j+1 ") j+1 +1 yields:
Thus, it follows from the product rule that
where u ii (S j ) can be determined from the relation
We have s
due to symmetry and
Now, it follows from (18) that
Finally, we note that
is continuous at the points " = S j and " = S j+1 : We can now conclude the following from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 above.
Corollary 2 The …rst-order condition of a market with N symmetric suppliers is given by:
We are now able to prove the …rst-order condition presented in the main text. , respectively. The …rst-order condition can be solved as follows. Proof. (Lemma 2) We have
so it follows from Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 that:
( 2 + 1)
A.2 Second-order conditions
For extreme cases when j = 0 or j = 1, the acceptance sensitivity with respect to quantity increments, i.e. 
For j = 0 and S i j < S k j , all producers get the same accepted quantity of marginal bids for " 2 S j 1 ; S j 1 + N S i j , while supplier i's accepted quantity from marginal bids is constant in the interval S j 1 + N S i j ; S j . Thus
The statement follows from di¤erentiation of the above expressions with respect to S i j 1 and S i j .
Lemma 9 If j = 1 and competitors have identical supply functions, S k j , then:
Proof. It follows from (2) that for j = 1 and S i j > S k j marginal bids are only accepted from supplier i, as long as its unmet supply at P j , S i j s i ("), is larger than for each other supplier. Thus
If instead j = 1 and S i j < S k j , then marginal bids are only accepted from competitors of supplier i, as long as each competitor's unmet supply at P j , S k j s k ("), is larger than for supplier i. In the next step, we want to prove that the …rst-order solution in (8) constitutes an NE. It follows from Lemma 6, Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 in Appendix that if 1 = 1 and 2 = 0, and competitors have an identical supply, S
We note that
is piece-wise linear in S i 1 with a break point at S i 1 = S k 1 , where
and it follows from (6) that
, which veri…es that (8) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if 1 = 1 and 2 = 0.
In the next step, we want to prove that the …rst-order solution in (9) constitutes an NE. It follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 in Appendix that if 1 = 2 = 0, and competitors have an identical supply, S
, then:
We have
with a break point at
= 0, so we can now conclude that
, which veri…es that (9) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for 1 = 2 = 0. It follows from Holmberg et al. (2013) that (10) constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Finally, the following argument shows that supplier i's loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 2 dominates the loss associated with the quantity e¤ect at P 1 for pro rata on the margin rationing. It follows from Assumption 1 and (6) that
(P 2 c) k i (N + 1) P 2 (N 1) (P 2 c) (N + 1) P 2 (P 2 c) k i = k i S i 1 (P 2 c) = S i 2 (P 2 c) ;
A.3 Approximate …rst-order condition for multiple price levels
The following lemma is useful when we want to analyse the convergence properties of the …rst-order condition as the number of steps per supply function increases.
Lemma 10 2. The discrete …rst-order condition in Corollary 2 can be approximated by:
Proof. The sum
must be of the order P j+1 , otherwise the …rst-order condition in Corollary 2 in Appendix cannot be satis…ed for small P j+1 . Supply schedules are symmetric and non-decreasing. Moreover, P j+1 C 0 i S i j+1 > 0, j > 0, N 2, and g (") > 0, so it follows that we must have:
We have that I is of the order P j+1 and S j S i j 0, so the above inequality implies that S j and S i j must both be of the order P j+1 or, equivalently, of the order P j , as r = P j P j+1 is bounded. In the next step, we want to derive the Taylor expansions of the …rst-order conditions. Using Taylor expansions and the above result, the …rst-order condition in Corollary 2 can be written:
Hence, as S j and S i j are of the order P j+1 :
It can be shown that
Using these results and that S j and S i j are of the order P j+1 , the Taylor expansion in (26) can be simpli…ed to:
We are now able to prove the following consistency statement in the main text. We have assumed that g is bounded away from zero. Thus ( j+1 + 1) P j+1 + j r S i j ( j + 1) P j +O ( P j+1 ) = 0:
Hence,
If S i j are replaced by samples of the continuous supply function q i (p) at price P j , then the left-hand side becomes an estimate of q 0 i (P j ) and the right-hand side converges to: q i (P j ) (N 1)
when q 0 i (P j ) is bounded. Thus, the …rst-order condition in Lemma 1 is consistent with the ordinary di¤erential equation in (11) when P j > C 0 i (q i (P j )) and j > 0.
